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Abstract 
This article is a comparative study that attempts to highlight the similarities and differences 
between  Bulgarian  agrarianism  and  Romanian  peasants  during  the  Interwar  period,  the  Second 
World War and period of transition towards the Leninist-Stalinist totalitarian regimes. The objectives 
of our approach are integrated within the boundaries of the main research directions and concrete 
levels, namely: the general context from the two countries, early agrarian/peasants’ movements, the 
political program, election results, the promotion of certain legislative measures, and the relationship 
with other political and institutional entities. Without trying to offer an exhaustive view or reveal new 
aspects in the strict sense of the term, our contribution confronts, in a coherent whole, a series of data 
and information on the basis of which one could make value judgments. These judgments might help to 
shape  a  global,  comparative  image.  Among  the  main  sources  of  the  article  we  included  the 
monographic works signed by Ioan Scurtu, Pamfil Șeicaru, Apostol Stan, Dimitrina Petrova, John D. 
Bell, R.J. Crampton, supplemented by data from several other publications (encyclopedias, syntheses 
etc.). 
One can identify several distinct stages within the period under review (1918-1947). 
The  broad  picture  is  that  the  Bulgarian  agrarian  group  was  more  popular  and  better 
organized than its Romanian counterpart, but more inclined towards Leftism and authoritarianism, 
which  led  to  its  political  isolation  in  1923  and  subsequent  fragmentation,  whilst  the  Romanian 
peasants’ movement managed, after 1924, to remain at the forefront of the political scene, showing an 
interest for dialogue and sometimes for compromise, first with The National Party, then with the 
authoritarian  monarchy,  but  also  with  the  Antonescu  regime  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  with  the 
communist regime. 
Keywords:  general  framework,  program,  elections,  legislative  measures,  external 
relations. 
1. Introduction 
During Interwar years, the agrarian parties (peasants’ parties) were by no means a 
negligible  political  reality  in  Central  and  Southeastern  Europe.  In  itself,  agrarianism 
(peasants’ parties) did not achieve a similar degree of systematization and coherence as other 
doctrines and political orientations: liberalism, conservatism, socialism etc. Without being an 
exhaustive analysis, this article intends to draw up a comparison between the evolution of 
Romanian Peasants’ parties and Bulgarian Agrarians for nearly three decades, from the end of 
the First World War until the establishment of totalitarian Leninist-Stalinist regimes.  
In one of his monographs, dedicated to The National Peasants’ Party, written before 
1989 and later republished without major changes, Romanian historian Ioan Scurtu included 
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some references regarding Romanian peasants’ relations with Bulgarian agrarians and some 
sporadic comparative considerations about the two movements (1). Previously, another study 
on  The  National  Party,  The  Peasants’  Party  and  The  National  Peasants’  Party  had  been 
published in exile by the great journalist Pamfil Șeicaru and then republished in Romania, in 
2002 (2). Also after 1989, Apostol Stan published his monograph on the peasants’ leader Ion 
Mihalache  (1882-1963)  (3).  Among  the  many  Bulgarian  contributions  about  the  agrarian 
movement  or  its  dominant  personality,  Aleksandar  Stamboliiski  (1879-1923),  the  paper 
published in 1988 by Dimitrina Petrova (4) stands out. However, her approach is hindered by 
a double category of limitations: the fact that she only dealt with three years of agrarian 
government and the ideological constraints specific to the period when she wrote her study. 
Nevertheless, John D. Bell (5)’s study eliminated these shortcomings. Although it’s not as 
extensive in length as the previous, it is very well documented and also analyzes the period 
1899-1919.  R.J. Crampton (6)’s study, published in 2009, deals with an even longer period 
since it also refers to the political and ideological legacy of Stamboliiski. 
In our view, this microanalysis will focus on the following issues: the overall context 
from  the  two  countries,  the  genesis  of  the  agrarian/peasants’  movements,  the  political 
program, the elections results, governmental activities and external relations. 
2. Contents 
In the fall of 1918 both Bulgaria (defeated in the war) and Romania (allied of the 
victors) were  faced with a precarious economic situation and an explosive socio-political 
context. Thus, Bulgaria’s human losses amounted to 155,000 deaths in battle, almost the same 
number  deaths  because  of  diseases,  and  400,000  wounded,  in  a  country  of  5-6  million 
inhabitants. A fifth of men aged between 20 and 50 had lost their lives (7) and the country had 
to bear the burden of more than 250,000 refugees (8).Romania’s losses at the end of the war 
included 339,000 deaths, 200,000 seriously injured and 116,000 prisoners and missing, with 
additional  civilian  sufferings  and  immense  damage  to  the  national  economy  because  of 
invading countries (railways, buildings, factories etc.) (9).  
In such a context, this led to an increased popularity of Leftist forces. Thus, we can 
remark not only the rise of Socialists in Romania and an impetuous entrance of the Bulgarian 
Communists on the political scene (1919), but also, the spectacular revival of The Bulgarian 
Agrarian National Union (BZNS), led by Aleksandăr Stamboliiski, and the creation of The 
Peasants’ Party in Romania, on 5
th/18
th December 1918, which quickly became, under the 
leadership of Ion Mihalache, one of the most important political forces.  
Besides some general, easy to notice, similarities between Bulgarian Agrarians and 
their counterparts, north of the Danube, there were, since 1918, major differences arising from 
different  political  contexts,  socio-economic  and  cultural  conditions  separating  the  two 
Southeastern European constitutional monarchies, both with German dynasties on the throne. 
The 1866 Constitution, amended in 1879 and 1883, included a series of civil rights and 
liberties but it left many responsabilities for the monarch (a king from 1881), and the suffrage 
was censitary, organised on the basis of colleges (initially three, then four) (10). In rural areas, 
the  main  issue  was  the  blatant  inequality  between  the  large  and  the  small  landowners, 
worsened by the leaseholders’ conduct (the majority of whom were non-Romanian), who only 
wanted  to  maximize  their  profits.  The  inequalities  between  the  categories  of  landowners 
continued to rise, reaching a climax in the first decade of the 20th century. Thus, in the eve of 
the 1907 revolt, almost a quarter of all Romanian peasants had no arable lands and one third 
owned less than three hectares per family (11). According to the 1912 Population Census, two 
thirds of those living in the countryside were illiterate, as opposed to a ˮmere” one third of  
illiterate city dwellers. The nationwide illiteracy rate was of 60.7% (12). 814    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Political Sciences, European Studies and IR 
 
In these circumstances, the trends and attempts to organize the Romanian peasants in a 
political party were spread over four decades (1878-1918) and shaped by numerous obstacles 
and setbacks. For 20 years (1878-1899), the teacher Constantin Dobrescu Arges (1856-1903) 
(13) was at the center of these efforts, followed by his brother-in-law, Alexandru Valescu, and 
Vasile  M.  Kogălniceanu  until  1907,  and,  after  1913,  by  Ion  Mihalache  (14).  Seemingly 
paradoxical, most of those who promoted Romanian peasants’ parties originated from the 
northern and hilly regions of Oltenia and Wallachia (the counties Arges, Muscel and Gorj), 
regions  with  a large rural  middle class, where the violent  peasant  movements  that shook 
Romania between 1888 and 1907 were somewhat milder. 
The Turnovo Constitution, enacted in 1879, was profoundly democratic but this fact 
did not stave off authoritarian governments or violent internal political confruntations. The 
land  distribution  was  quite  equitable  but  the  excessive  taxation,  the  agricultural 
ineffectiveness of small lots, the technological backwardeness, the lack of capital and the 
activity of extortioners, the low productivity, they all made a difference (15). Nonetheless, the 
cultural  and  literacy  levels  were  higher  in  Bulgaria  as  the  primary  and  secondary  school 
systems were unmatched elsewhere in Southeastern Europe (16).  
The  genesis  of  The  Bulgarian  Agrarian  Union  (1899;  since  1901  The  Bulgarian 
Agrarian  National  Union-BZNS),  transformed  into  a  political  party  in  1906,  consisted  in 
merging  several  groups  that  were  acting  independently  during  the  last  years  of  the  19
th 
century, under the leadership of Jordan Pekarev in the Varna area, Dimităr Dragiev in the 
Stara Zagora area, of  Janko Zabunov in the Pleven area etc (17).  
Also, the two movements did not achieve similar political results at this stage. The 
Romanian Peasants were never able to win more than four seats in the lower house of the 
Parliament and after 1899 they didn’t have any representatives there (18). On the other hand, 
BZNS  was  in  1908  the  largest  opposition  party  in  Bulgaria,  with  100,000  votes  and  23 
parliamentary seats (19). 
Furthermore, the Romanian Peasants’ ideology displayed a greater openness towards 
the Right of the political spectrum, which manifested as a respectful attitude in regards to the 
monarchy and the importance given to religion and the Church. Subsequently, some Peasants’ 
leaders even joined The National Liberal Party (e.g. Al. Valescu) or, after 1918, The People's 
Party (V. M. Kogălniceanu).  
The bloody events of 1913-1918 would favor the coagulation of the Peasants’ Party in 
Romania and of BZNS’s rise to power in Bulgaria. The Second Balkan War disrupted the 
public  opinion  in  both  countries.  For  Bulgaria,  it  was  a  serious  warning,  unfortunately 
ignored, concerning an aggressive and offensive foreign policy in the Balkans, whilst for the 
great mass of Romanian peasant soldiers, the contact with Bulgarian rural realities, devoid of 
blatant social inequality, was a real shock, which prompted the Liberals, who were in the 
opposition, to relaunch in October 1913, the idea of agrarian and electoral reforms, and when 
in power in January 1914, to initiate the proceedings related to these reforms (20). 
Ion  Mihalache,  elected  as  president  of  the  National  Coucil  of  Teachers  in  the 
December 1913 (21), viewed Bulgaria as a model in terms of the land tenure system and 
agrarian relations, but did not ignore the adventurous policy pursued by the Sofia government 
(22), openly and strongly criticized by Al. Stamboliiski (BZNS leader, since 1911) who, after 
the  outbreak  of  the  First  World  War,  advocated  the  granting  of  territorial  advantages  in 
Macedonia and Southern Dobrudja by means of a favorable neutrality towards the Entente, 
not by an alliance with the Central Powers (23). King Ferdinand and the Vasil Radoslavov 
government would choose, after a year of deliberations exactly the opposite path; following a 
savory, casual and well-known exchange of words with the sovereign (24), Stamboliiski was 
sent to prison, his life being in permanent danger for three years. In the years 1916-1918, Ion 
Mihalache was also in imminent danger as a young, junior-ranking Romanian officer on the Cornel POPESCU, George Daniel UNGUREANU  815 
 
battlefield,  convinced  by  the  justice  of  his  country's  war,  but  also  by  the  necessity  of 
establishing a peasants’ party (25).Moreover, even during the war, in the summer of 1917, the 
Romanian Parliament, which took refuge in Iassy, adopted the constitutional amendments that 
made  possible  major  social  and  political  reforms,  namely  the  introduction  of  universal 
suffrage and land reform for peasants-soldiers, paving the way for the direct participation of 
peasantry in politics (26). 
A few days before the armistice of Thessaloniki (September 29
th 1918), Stamboliiski 
was released from prison, which meant that BZNS was de facto a legal movement again. He 
did not conceal his republican aspirations and was involved, shortly after his release from 
prison, in the military uprising from Radomir, whose main goal was the proclamation of the 
republic by overthrowing the entire dynasty, not only Ferdinand, considered however, by 
most Bulgarians, an ill-fated victim (27). On October 17
th 1918, the Agrarians were included 
in the Al. Malinov government, as Ts. Tserkovski became the Minister of Public Works, then 
in the Teodor Teodorov government (November 28
th 1918 – October 6
th 1919), a conservative 
russophile, they would be better represented as Al Stamboliiski himself (Public Works), D. 
Dragiev  (Agriculture  and  Public  Domains)  and  Ts.  Tserkovski  (Transport  and 
Communications) also became ministers
 (28).  
The demobilized reservist, Lieutenant Ion Mihalache was able to resume his political 
activity,  in  an  expanded  country  after  the  union  of  Bessarabia  (27
th  March/April  9
th), 
Bukovina  (15
th/28
th  November)  and  Transylvania  (18
th  November/1
st  December)  with  the 
mother  country  during  1918.  On  December  5
th/18
th  1918,  in  Bucharest,  there  was  the 
constituent congress of the Peasants’ Party (a strong provincial peasants’ party already existed 
in  Bessarabia).  On  this  occasion,  an  11  points  program-declaration  was  adopted,  related 
exclusively to peasantry’s issues such as the full ownership of all lands by peasants and, in 
return,  reasonable  compensations,  or  the  restoration  of  ancient  rights  to  use  forests  and 
pastures. Other claims were related to local and provincial autonomy, the enlightenment of 
villages,  proportional  taxation,  the  decentralization  of  cooperatives,  Church  autonomy, 
replacing  the  Gendarmerie,  health  service  reforms  and  the  punishment  of  those  enriched 
during the war (29). The preamble of the document, highlighted the social importance of the 
peasantry, the workers and intellectuals were called to cooperate with the peasants “against 
the rule of the boyars and Bolshevism” (30). For a while, in 1919, the name “Peasants’ and 
Workers’ Party” was also used, informally, as propaganda; the party's electoral symbol was 
the sickle (31). 
This direction was re-affirmed at the General Congress from 20-21 November 1921, 
when the merger with The Peasants’ Party of Bessarabia, Pantelimon Halippa - C. Stere wing 
was  validated  and  a  more  coherent  program  was  adopted.  The  document  criticized  the 
“capitalist imperialism”, “class struggle” was considered a reality, and the general view was 
that given the particular conditions from Romania, it was the great mass of peasants’ task to 
eliminate this social system, which, together with the urban working class, would advance on 
a “third path”, namely “the cooperative peasantry” (32), subsequently theorized by Virgil 
Madgearu  (1887-1940).  Referring  to  the  slogan  of  “class  struggle”  Stamboliiski  also 
disassociated  himself  from  communists,  accusing  them  of  narrow-mindedness  and 
superficiality. According to the Bulgarian Agrarian leader, antagonisms between occupational 
groups were stronger than differences in wealth, at least in his country, where, he argued, 
large  landowners  were  scarce,  unable  to  endanger  the  homogeneity  of  peasantry  (33). 
Therefore,  Romanian  Peasants’  movement  members  treated  the  industrialization  and 
industrial  workers  problems  rather  differently,  whereas  Bulgarian  Agrarians,  led  by 
Stamboliiski, were reluctant towards the workers’ “occupational group”. 
In  a  historical  coincidence,  at  the  end  of  1919,  both  the  Romanian  Peasants’ 
movement and the Bulgarian Agrarians were part of ephemeral coalition governments, which 816    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Political Sciences, European Studies and IR 
 
had the urgent task of signing unpopular international treaties in the eyes of public opinion, 
namely The Minorities Treaty for Romania and the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine for Bulgaria. 
Having obtained the relative majority at the August 1919 elections, the Bulgarian Agrarians 
were the core of the coalition government between October 6
th 1919- April 21
st1920, and 
Stamboliiski  became  the  P.M.,  who  after  new  elections  and  post-election  maneuvering, 
formed a monochromatic agrarian government, which was in power for the next three years 
(34). At the November 1919 elections in Romania, The Peasants Party obtained 61 deputies 
and  28  senators,  being  defeated  by  The  Romanian  National  Party  (P.N.R),  based  in 
Transylvania (169 deputies and 76 senators), P.N.L. (103 deputies and 54 senators) and The 
Peasants’ Party from Bessarabia, which hadn’t yet disbanded (72 deputies and 35 senators) 
(35). A governmental coalition was formed, called “The Parliamentary Block”, dominated by 
P.N.R, which also included The Peasants’ Party from Bessarabia, the similar party from Old 
Kingdom, N. Iorga’s National Democratic Party, The Democratic Union Party from Bukovina 
and The  Labour Party (Dr. Nicolae  Lupu); the  government  leadership  went  to  Al. Vaida 
Voivod, The Peasants’ Party obtained two portfolios (Agriculture with Ion Mihalache and 
Public Instruction, with the zoologist Ion Borcea) and The Bessarabian Peasants’ Party, three, 
namely the Ministry of Justice, with  Ion Pelivan, and two posts  of Minister of State  for 
Bessarabia, with P. Halippa and Ion Inculeţ (36). 
The government was in power between December 1
st 1919 and March 12
th 1920. It's 
dismissal  was  due  to  King  Ferdinand’  dissatisfaction  (1914-1927)  towards  a  series  of 
legislative initiatives (the Mihalache project for land reform and N. Lupu's proposals for the 
mandatory  rental  of  vacant  houses  and  reducing  the  responsailities  and  numbers  of  the 
Gendarmerie) considered as Leftist by the sovereign; some suspicions were also stirred by 
establishing diplomatic contacts with the Soviets (37). 
Mihalache’s project for agrarian reform was halfway between the plans of past and 
future governmental leaders from Bucharest, on the one hand, and the ideological vision of 
the Bulgarian Agrarians, on the other hand, and was inspired by legislation adopted in Poland 
and Czechoslovakia. In essence, Ion Mihalache’s project, remained in draft form (except for 
Bessarabia), provided that large estates would be limited to 100 hectares, except for those 
where modernizing investments had been made. For these, the maximum limit was of 250 
hectares in populated areas, and 500 hectares in settlement areas. In order to promote efficient 
agriculture,  it  also  proposed  to  encourage  the  establishment  of  cooperatives  and  model 
allotments, managed by industrious peasants (38). On the eve of the fall of the government, 
the land reform was enacted in Bessarabia and this sanctioned, post factum, the liquidation of 
big land properties in the province, which happened de facto, in the years 1917-1918; before 
the Russian Revolution, in Bessarabia, 95% of the villagers were totally or almost totally 
deprived of land, while 0.35% of them had a third of the total agricultural area, and 4.5% 
around 60% (39). After the revolutionary turmoil of 1917-1918, the situation now became 
legal. 
One of the causes that led to the fall of the first Al. Vaida Voevod government was the 
fact that it no longer had the king’s support. The king’s new attitude toward the party was 
influenced  by  a  radical  law  project,  initiated  by  dr.  N.  Lupu,  which  sought  to  make  it 
compulsory for urban house owners to rent extra rooms, at prices considered reasonable (40). 
In this respect, the Stambolyiski government went even further, adopting, de jure, in June 
1920, the Turlakov law, which stipulated, right from its title, the possibility of expropriating 
some  dwellings  for  public  interest,  in  emergency  situations;  still,  the  law  itself  and  its 
implementation were not as radical as its title (41). 
In March 1920, the Romanian government was entrusted by the king to The People's 
Party, whose founder, General Al. Averescu (1859-1938), became president of the Council of 
Ministers, a position he would hold until December 1921; V.M. Kogălniceanu, now member Cornel POPESCU, George Daniel UNGUREANU  817 
 
in this new party, was appointed in July 1921 to read before The Assembly of Deputies, 
elected in May 1920, the agrarian reform project, which would also be adopted. The act, 
designed by Constantin Garoflid, set a 500 hectares limit for large estates and a 5 hectares 
minimum area for a viable farm (42). Thus, the most significant land reform in Southeastern 
Europe was enacted, which allotted six million hectares of arable land to 1.4 million peasant 
families. However, the law enforcement was slow and incomplete, and 600,000 families of 
the 2,005,477 entitled to allotment, did not benefit of their legal rights (43). 
On May 12
th 1921, a land reform was enacted in Bulgaria too, on a smaller scale (there 
wasn’t much land available anyway), and about 330,000 hectares, belonging to the state, local 
authorities and monastic establishments, were distributed to a total of 64,000 families from 
within the country and 28,500 families of refugees from Macedonia, Thrace and Dobrudja 
(44).  As  a  result  of  these  measures,  in  Bulgaria,  in  the  mid-1920s,  57%  of  Bulgarian 
agricultural holdings were smaller than 5 hectares and 28%, between 5 and 10 hectares (45). 
Comparing  Ion  Mihalache’s  and  Stamboliiski’s  views  on  the  agrarian  reform,  we 
notice a different attitude toward the Church and clergy. I. Mihalache, a devout Orthodox 
Christian, believed that churches would become future micro-farms, where faith in God might 
spur work and good management (46). Thus, according to the reform  of March 1920, in 
Bessarabia each monastery had 50 hectares of arable land, vineyards and gardens in addition 
to those already in their possession, and the churches, had “full allotment” (6-8 hectares) for 
each cleric (priest, parish clerk or deacon) (47). Al. Stamboliiski more skeptical about religion 
and prone to  pragmatic and worldly things,  made monastic  areas  the  main targets  of his 
program  of  expropriation;  he  acknowledged  the  positive  historical  role  of  the  Bulgarian 
Orthodox  clergy  for  the  Bulgarian  revival,  but  probably  influenced  by  Ernest  Renan,  he 
accused contemporary priests of undermining the authority of the teaching staff and lack of 
interest in people's concrete problems (48). 
Compared to the Romanian Peasants’ movement in first third of 1920’s Stamboliiski 
was more preoccupied by the issue of agricultural land consolidation, strongly supporting the 
cooperative  movement.  As  a  result  of  this  conduct,  at  the  end  of  1920,  the  cooperative 
associations  membership  reached  398,000,  of  which  about  274,000  were  conscripted  into 
urban cooperative (trade, credit, handicraft production, services, etc.), and 124,000 into rural 
ones  (agricultural,  forestry,  vineyards  and  wine  etc.).  In  1923,  there  were  about  2,300 
cooperatives, grouped by specialization (49). 
Other important measures of the Stamboliiski government targeted the legal system, 
which became more accessible to ordinary people, taxation (progressive income tax was a 
reality) and especially education (50). Schools were subordinated to local authorities, and the 
school curriculum promoted practical activities and refuted chauvinistic elements. About 300 
primary schools and 800 secondary schools were built, since secondary education was now 
compulsory in Bulgaria (51). 
A goal of the Leftist forces in the twentieth century was the promotion of women in 
public  life.  For  Stamboliiskist  Bulgaria  the  best  known  example  is  the  rise  of  Nadeždei 
Stančova, the daughter of Dimităr Stančov (52), a diplomat, promoted as the official translator 
of the P.M. and the first female diplomat, similar to Alexandra Kollontay’s case. In Romania, 
a similar policy consisted in granting conditional right to vote and to  go to the polls for 
women in local and regional elections during the Iuliu Maniu government on the basis of the 
administrative law from August 3
rd 1929, proposed by Ion Mihalache (53). 
Military restrictions imposed on Bulgaria by the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine facilitated 
the imposition of measures targeting the replacement of regular army troops with a popular 
militia (a long-time agrarian goal), by creating working troops trudovacii (54). In Romania, at 
the  1921  and  1922  congresses,  where  the  left  wing  was  underrepresented,  Romanian 818    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Political Sciences, European Studies and IR 
 
Peasants’ supporters were not that vocal with their demands for the “democratization” of the 
army and of the Gendarmerie (55). 
A  goal  of  both  movements,  from  Bulgaria  and  Romania,  was  the  administrative 
decentralization. Curiously, Romanian agrarians also considered provincial autonomy (also on 
the basis of the law promoted by Mihalache on August 3
rd 1929 that would set up seven 
directorates: Muntenia, Oltenia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, Transylvania, Bukovina, Banat) (56), 
whilst Bulgarian agrarians only thought of local and regional autonomy. In Greater Romania, 
granting  substantial  autonomy  could  favor  segregating,  separatist  and  even  hegemonic 
provincial  attitudes  and plans of national  minorities  in  the newly united provinces  of the 
country, groups that had acquired, due to foreign domination, a superior material and cultural 
situation  compared  to  that  of  the  Romanian  majority:  the  Hungarians  in  Transylvania, 
Russians in Bessarabia and Germans in Bukovina and Banat. Bulgaria, as a country defeated 
in war, did not face the problem of integrating new territories, the Turkish minority was in a 
precarious state, Jews and Greeks were few in number and dissipated, thus being unable to 
endanger the unity of the state. 
In foreign policy, we can identify, for the period 1919-1923, some similarities between 
Romanian and Bulgarian Agrarians. The former sought to promote Romania's relations with 
former war allies and a policy of collaboration and, if possible, reconciliation with bordering 
states and the latter aimed to improve Bulgaria’s situation by winning the goodwill of the 
victorious states and promoting a peaceful policy towards her neighbors. The attitude toward 
Soviet Russia suggested a slight difference, while Stamboliiski restored de facto Bulgarian-
Soviet trade relations in 1921 (57), the “Parliamentary Block” government, led by Al. Vaida 
Voevod (November 1919 - March 1920) undertook negotiations with the Soviets, in order to 
settle the territorial statu quo on the river Dniester (Nistru) (58). 
In  essence,  Stamboliiski’s  government  inaugurated  a  policy  of  so-called  “peaceful 
revisionism”,  which  would  be  a  feature  of  Bulgaria's  diplomatic  conduct  throughout  the 
interwar period, with some slight changes influenced by the European context (59). The head 
of the Bulgarian government made no secret of his desire to revise the Treaty of Neuilly, but 
he opposed the irredentist and militaristic trends and, especially Macedonian organizations 
(60), as he wanted to reconcile with the Yugoslav state, and his main territorial claim was 
related to access to the Aegean Sea, won in 1913 and lost in 1919. 
World War I had not made the BZNS leader abandon his pacifist vision and Balkan-
type  federalist  and  internationalist  aspirations.  He  supported  the  initiative  of  his  Czech 
Agrarian  counterpart,  Antonin  Švehla,  of  setting  up  an  “A  Green  International”, 
encompassing all agrarian parties from Eastern Europe. The project, launched in early 1921, 
failed because of the divergent positions of potential participants in national-territorial issues. 
For  example,  Croats  wanted  support  for  separation  from  the  hegemony  of  Belgrade,  and 
Romanians were suspicious, fearing Slavic domination
 (61). 
The Romanian peasants’ promoted an open doors policy in the face of foreign capital 
and  Stamboliiski  too,  a  convinced  anti-industrialist,  had  no  objections  to  the  idea  of 
systematic trade with industrialized Western European states (62). 
The direct relationship between the two party leaders peasant was neither constant nor 
fruitful. In January 1921, during his visit in Bucharest, Al. Stamboliiski discussed with V. 
Madgearu and I. Mihalache about the collaboration between the two parties. Upon returning 
home, the Bulgarian Agrarian leader stated, at Rusciuk, that he had reached an agreement 
with  the  two  Romanian  Peasants’  leaders  concerning  the  return  of  Southern  Dobrudja  to 
Bulgaria. Although he later denied this statement, which, in all likelihood, was false, it led to 
serious accusations against The Peasants’ Party from political opponents. It was suggested the 
Bulgarian  leader,  had  bribbed  the  two  peasants’  leaders  whom  he  had  met  (63).  These 
allegations were essentially fantasies, but, during the interwar years, The Peasants’ Party and, Cornel POPESCU, George Daniel UNGUREANU  819 
 
after 1926, The National Peasants’ Party (PNŢ), by its Leftist wing, were, among the major 
Romanian parties, the most receptive to claims from Southern Dobrudjan Bulgarians (64). 
As  a  result  of  the  negative  campaign  initiated  after  the  Mihalache-Madgearu- 
Stamboliiski discussions and the unexpected statements  of the latter, The Peasants’ Party 
adopted  a  more  reserved  attitude  towards  BZNS  and  its  international  initiatives.  At  the 
Bulgarian Agrarians Congress in June 1922, The Peasants’ Party just sent a telegram, not a 
delegation (65). A few months later, the head of the Bulgarian government visited Romania 
for the second time (from 4
th until 8
th November 1922), but this time he did not meet with any 
peasants’ leaders (66).  
In  domestic  politics,  Stamboliiski’s  attitudes,  speeches  and  deeds  were  more 
aggressive  towards  left  and  right  wing  political  opponents,  compared  with  Romanian 
Peasants. Even if the general policy of the Bulgarian Agrarian government was not anti-urban, 
as  one  would  be  tempted  to  believe,  judging  solely  by  Stamboliiski's  statements,  more 
categorical than those of his Romanian and Serbian counterparts, it is still true that BZNS’s 
popularity  was  reduced  in  cities  where  there  were  cores  of  communist  parties  and  of 
traditional center or right wing parties. 
A symptom of BZNS’s aggressive policy (otherwise, Bulgarian politics did not excel 
in tolerance) was the establishment of “The Orange Guard”, made up of peasants armed with 
clubs during street riots in the summer of 1919 as a shock force against communists, who 
made their impetuous entrance on the Bulgarian political scene (67). 
Al. Stamboliiski’s relationship with The Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) was quite 
changing and ambivalent. In the period October 1919 - May 1920, the Bulgarian agrarian 
leader preferred to seek an alliance with elements of the former regime (M. Madžarov, A. 
Burov,  St.  Danev),  not  with  the  Bolsheviks,  and  in  spring  1920  he  obtained  an  absolute 
majority in Parliament only after invalidating several BKP deputies, but a year later, after 
Lenin softened his attitude towards farmers, adopting NEP, the BZNS praised the Bolshevik 
revolution  and  talked  about  “the  democratization”  of  Soviet  Russia  (68).  In  1922,  the 
communists backed the authorities' campaign against elements of the former government, but 
relations again worsen with the spring elections of 1923, when the Agrarians got 54% of the 
votes and a clear majority in Săbranje, as a result of the distribution of votes system (69). 
In Romania,  although some serious social inequities persisted after enactment  and 
implementation  of  the  major  reforms,  the  socialists  only  asserted  an  ephemeral  political 
influence during the period 1919-1921, after which they divided into communists and social 
democrats, the former being outlawed in 1924 due to their position in the national issue. 
In 1921 and 1922, when the communists’ anti-national deviations were less obvious, 
Romanian agrarians condemned the measures of force adopted by Al. Averescu and  Ion I. C. 
Brătianu governments, directed at them, fearing that they themselves might be the victims of 
such unconstitutional practices, in terms of guarantees of civil rights and liberties, especially 
since they were constantly accused of “Bolshevism” (70). “The Peasants’ are, for now, with 
us in the fight against capitalist oligarchy”, wrote in February 1922, Romanian communist 
leader  Petre  Constantinescu-Iaşi  (71);  otherwise,  in  Leninist  theory  and  practice,  “fellow 
travelers” (paputniki) had important roles, but then followed marginalization and elimination, 
and most Romanian Peasants’ did not choose such a path. 
Monarchy  was  also  regarded  differently  by  agrarians  from  the  two  banks  of  the 
Danube.  For  Stamboliiski,  it  represented  a  foreign  institution,  parasitic  and  resource 
consuming, whose influence should be minimum, waiting the right time for the proclamation 
of the republic. Romanian Peasants’ saw in monarchy, not necessarily in King Ferdinand, 
clearly dominated by the Liberal leader Ion I.C. Brătianu, a possible counterweight to PNL. 
In  June  1923,  following  a  bloody  coup  d’etat,  which  was  planned  by  right-wing 
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of  King  Boris  III  (1918-1943)  and  the  total  neutrality  of  the  communists,  Stamboliiski 
government was overthrown and its leader killed. The sympathy of peasant masses did not 
prove sufficient to overcome political isolation.  
In view of the available data, it seems very likely that irredentist Bulgarian-Dobrudjan 
groups were involved in the events of June 1923 (72). The researcher Blagovest Njagulov 
states that, in 1921, the Stamboliiski government did not express its protests concerning the 
confiscation of lands belonging to ethnic Bulgarians in the Quadrilateral, as a part of the 
Romanian  agrarian  reform,  because  these  measures  affected  a  social  category  that  was 
doomed even according to the rhetoric of Bulgarian agrarians (73). 
In June 1923, the classic Agrarian period ended in Bulgaria and was near the end in 
Romania. A period of about  a quarter of a century of slow  decline, punctuated by some 
moments of partial or apparent revitalization, would follow. Despite the persistence of a solid 
popularity among the peasantry, and its collective memory, from a historical perspective the 
political  fragmentation  and  the  ideological  change  were  dominant  for  Bulgarian  and 
Romanian Agrarians during this period, in a general context that did not lack changes, some 
peaceful, others, the consequences of the Second World War and its outcome. 
During the interwar years, Romania and Bulgaria were the least urbanized countries in 
Europe, with a rural population of about 80% in both countries around 1930 (74), but the 
potential and trends for industrialization and urbanization were more relevant for Romania, 
especially after the union with Transylvania, where the economic importance of Hungarians 
and Germans was superior to their demographic significance. 
A number of statistical indicators of this period reveal the inferiority of agriculture in 
both countries, not only in relation to the domestic industry but also with Western European 
agriculture.  Thus,  in  terms  of  statistics,  a  Balkan  farmer  produced  food  for  only  1.5 
individuals, while in the West the ratio was 1 to 4 (75). 
In  Romania,  the  implementation  of  the  agrarian  reform,  enacted  in  1921  had 
significantly  improved  the  lives  of  many  peasant  families,  contributing,  consequently,  to 
broaden the cultural horizon and increasing the interest in social and political life, but the 
fragmentation  of  land  lots  led  to  a  considerable  decrease  of  agricultural  exports,  the 
proportion of plant and animal elements in Romanian exports plummeted sharply between 
1922 and 1934, from 80% to 46%, reaching 56% in 1938 (76). 
Meanwhile, the trend of polarization of land holdings and the (re)-expansion of large 
farms restarted,  at the expense of smaller farms, a phenomenon facilitated by a law issued in 
1929, initiated by Ion Mihalache. Towards the end of the 1930's, the Romanian agriculture 
included 3,280,000 holdings, totaling 19.75 million hectares. Three quarters of these farms 
(2,460,000) were less than five hectares, the minimum area set in 1921. They amounted to 
5,350,000  hectares,  or  28%  of  arable  land,  as  much  as  12,200  farms  that  exceeded  100 
hectares  each,  of  which  2,700  were  more  than  500  hectares  each;  610,000  agricultural 
properties, or 18.6% of the total, were less than one hectare (77). 
In Bulgaria, the Stamboliiski reform and further developments, until 1946, suggest a 
continuing trend of fragmentation and of polarization, the latter manifested in the form of 
cooperatives. The number, total area and the proportion of properties less than 10 hectares 
steadily increased between 1926 and 1946 in parallel with the decrease of these indicators for 
properties larger than 10 hectares. For example, in 1926, there were 800 farms larger than 50 
hectares, with a total of 85,000 hectares, which represented 2% of total arable land. By 1934, 
this number had dropped to 500 holdings, with a total of 69,000 hectares or 1.6% of the total 
arable land and, until 1946, these indicators had reached 200, 29,000 and 0.7% (78). The 
cooperative movement also showed a rebound between 1934 and 1944 from 4,888 units with 
836,742  members  to  4,114,  with  625,000  members,  but  the  share  of  rural  cooperatives 
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While Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had a rate of 70-80% of the population 
employed in agriculture, in Hungary this indicator was 53% and in Czechoslovakia 38%. In 
1920  just  31%  of  Germany’s  population  and  42%  of  France’s  were  concentrated  in 
agriculture; since the mid-19
th century more than half of England’s working population was 
engaged  in  non-agricultural  activities  (80).  Agricultural  overpopulation  led  to  the 
phenomenon of labor surplus in rural areas, and, given the low level of mechanization, this 
situation revealed, ipso facto, the utopian character of visions and projects of a “Peasants’ 
state”.  Half  of  Bulgarian  and  Romanian  peasantry  was  used  under  its  normal  working 
capacity in the 1930’s (81). Even in these conditions, between 1920 and 1940, Bulgaria’s and 
Romania’s productions of grain and potatoes have increased more, in terms of percentage, 
than their populations. For Bulgaria, these indicators were 53%, 187% and 25%, for Romania, 
the  figures  were  32%,  49%  and  23%  (82).  Agricultural  labor  productivity  was  higher  in 
Bulgaria (110$ compared to 90$ in Romania) (83).  
The literacy rate in Greater Romania, in 1930, was 57.6%, whilst in 1934, in Bulgaria, 
the illiteracy rate was below 32%, and this phenomenon was more present among the Turkish-
Muslim minority (84). During the period 1920-1934, both in Romania and in Bulgaria, the 
infant mortality decreased from 207 to 179 and from 160 to 144, for every one thousand 
newborns.  Still, during 1935-1939 this indicator showed a slight increase in both countries, 
reaching 181 and 146 cases (85).  
In these internal conditions, the evolution or involution of agrarian movements from 
both countries had several stages. A first stage starts with the fall of Stamboliiski in Bulgaria 
(June 1923) and ends with PNŢ’s rise to power (November 1928), and is characterized for 
Bulgarian Agrarians by political fragmentation after the violent demise of the founder (and 
other leaders), and for the Romanian by ideological concessions under the leadership of Ion 
Mihalache, resulting in certain manifestations of dissent and political fragmentation. 
The  anti-agrarian  repression  from  Bulgaria  triggered  on  June  9
th  1923,  caused  an 
atmosphere of almost civil war in the country. Not only Al. Stamboliiski and his brother, 
Vasil, were among the victims, both martyred on June 14
th, but many other activists and their 
supporters, including over 20 MP’s (Spas Duparinov, Krum Popov, Dimităr Kemalov, Stojan 
Kolučev  etc.)  (86).  The  beheaded  Bulgarian  Agrarian  movement  split  into  three  wings: 
“moderates”  willing  to  cooperate  with  the  Al.  Tsankov  government,  “centrists”  (Tsanko 
Tserkovski, Petăr Janev and Petko Petkov, who was assassinated, in April 1924), and “left” 
wing, inclined to cooperate with the communists (Dimităr Grančarov and Rajko Daskalov, 
who was assassinated in Prague in August, by a Macedonian agent) (87). 
In September 1923 the agrarian-communist rebellion, with the epicenter in northwest, 
triggered new reprisals and violence, the death toll reaching 20,000, of which 4,200 were 
Macedonian activists (88). Under the Andrej Ljapčev government (1926-1931), there was a 
gradual  normalization of the political  life that  allowed the  emergence  of several  agrarian 
groups, of which the most important were Pladne (“Noon”, in English), which published the 
gazette with the same name and Vrabča1 (“Sparrow”), named after the street in Sofia where it 
had his headquarters. The first group, with a left-wing orientation, included G. Vălkov and 
Georgi M. Dimitrov, in connection with Al. Obbov şi Kosta Todorov, pro-Yugoslavians. The 
second group, with a slight right-wing orientation, was headed by Dimitar Gičev, with a B.A. 
in Theology, and the jurist Kosta Muraviev, Al. Stamboliiski’s nephew (89). 
The events from Bulgaria did not go unnoticed north of the Danube. Initially, the 
Romanian Peasants’ movement condemned the coup d’etat from June 1923, criticizing the 
National Liberal government's attitude, considered to be favorable to the coup (89), but on the 
long term they reflected upon the issue of leaving aside radical slogans and claims to avoid 
the perspective of political isolation (90). Coincidentally or not, I. Mihalache’s personality 
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complex related to culturally refined politicians, wanted to assimilate everything that was 
new, and started, among other things, to learn French, German and English, which he was 
finally  able  to  speak  quite  good  (91).  Still,  he  did  not  give  up  the  traditional  peasant’s 
clothing, not even in official occasions, like the Polish agrarian leader, Wincenty Witos; Al. 
Stamboliiski, without excelling in elegance, preffered the modern Western suit, including a 
tie. 
In  1924,  the  Romanian  Peasants  made  a  clear  choice.  They  finally  responded 
negatively in March to a communist proposal of setting up a “Workers’ and Peasants’ Block”, 
when  Comintern  was  preparing  an  extensive  destabilizing  action  throughout  Southeastern 
Europe (92). The Romanian leaders claimed they did not want an internal revolution, nor did 
they desire a war with the capitalist Great Powers (93) and turned their attention toward the 
former  government  partners  in  1919-1920,  namely  PNR,  with  which  they  reached  an 
agreement in June on the basis of a ten points joint program: constitutional monarchy, a 
national  solidarity  centered  around  peasantry,  national  sovereignty,  a  foreign  policy  of 
friendship  with  former  allies  and  peace  with  its  neighbors,  a  constitutional  regime,  fair 
elections, administrative decentralization, “a special concern for the army”. The economic 
policy would  be based  on:  the promotion  of cooperatives,  the strengthening of industries 
complementary to  agriculture, opening to  foreign  capital  and developing labor laws  (94). 
Based on this compromise, in October 1926, the two parties would merge, forming the PNȚ, 
with Iuliu Maniu as president. The compromise was disliked by some right-wing members 
from PNR, Stelian Popescu, Nicolae Iorga and Constantin Argetoianu leaving the party when 
the merger was imminent.  The more radical elements from The Peasants’ Party also did not 
agree with the compromise, the most notorious case being that of Dr. Nicolae Lupu, who in 
1927 formed a distinct Peasants’ Leftist party.  
The Great Depression of 1929-1933 affected the Romanian and Bulgarian peasantry, 
because of the rapid collapse of crop prices and, to a somewhat lesser extent, of animal-based 
products. In these unfavorable international economic conditions, both in Romania and in 
Bulgaria, the Peasants, and the Agrarian faction Vrabča1, were part of government coalitions 
within heterogeneous entities, namely PNȚ and the “Popular Block”, which reached power 
when  people's  expectations  were  high.  Thus,  PNȚ,  where  a  certain  fault  line  persisted 
between former nationals and peasants, with additional rivalries between Maniu and Vaida, 
rose  to  government  in  November  1928  and  won  the  elections  held  next  month  with  an 
overwhelming score of 77%, impossible to explain just by the fact that the party organized the 
elections (95). In Bulgaria, the “People’s Block”, a coalition of democrats, radicals, the liberal 
group Petrov, and Vrabča1 won the parliamentary elections of June 18
th 1931, defeating the 
ruling party, which organized them (96). Instead, at the elections held in Romania in July 
1932 by the government VaidaVoevod after the Argetoianu-Iorga government (April 1931-
May 1932), PNȚ only won 40.3% of the votes, almost not reaching the 40 percent threshold 
needed to get the “majority bonus” prescribed by the electoral law of March 1926 (97). 
If we analyze the composition of various national-peasants’ governments that were in 
power during November 1928-April 1931, it appears that the Peasants came second, despite 
having an equal number of portfolios as the nationals, but never holding the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers, a position entrusted to I. Maniu, Al. Vaida Voevod and G. Mironescu, 
nor the Foreign Affaires Ministry (98). In Bulgaria, although Vrabča was the most important 
force  in  the  “People’s  Block”,  gaining  69  seats  in  Săbranje  (the  Democrats  had  43,  the 
National  Liberals 32 and the Radicals 8 out of 272), the Democratic Party had the main 
government role. It acted as the head of government, and Al. Malinov, then Nikola Mušanov 
were P.M.’s and they also had key ministries (Internal, Foreign Affairs, and Finance) and the 
Public  Health  ministry.  The  agrarians  got  only  three  ministries:  Agriculture  with  Gičev, 
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Interestingly, during November 1928-April 1931, the National Peasants’ governments 
did not even declaratively adopt a law on the conversion of agricultural debts (100), a first 
regulatory law in this regard being issued by the Iorga-Argetoianu government, followed by 
the Vaida government in 1933, and then by the Gh. Tătărescu government in 1934 (101). In 
Bulgaria too, “The People’s Block” government issued such a law (102). In March 28
th 1929 
the cooperative law was issued, which reorganized the Chamber of Agriculture, the Rural 
House and other institutions (103), and on August 20
th, the so-called “Mihalache law” on the 
selling of lands facilitated land transactions; an effect of this law was that between 1930 and 
1941, the percentage of households with an area between 10 and 100 hectares fell from 7.6% 
to 6.4%, but their proportion from the total area increased significantly from 14 to 24% (104).  
In  the  educational  field,  the  P.N.Ţ.  government  only  managed  to  transform  the 
Herăstrău  and  Cluj-Napoca  Higher  Schools  of  Agriculture  into  Academies  for  Advanced 
Economic Studies (105), so its performance was far from Stamboliiski’s. 
In the  context  of the  economic crisis,  both  agrarian governments  faced  challenges 
from the monarchy and the communists. 
The return of Charles II (b. 1894 -d. 1953) in the country, the cancellation of the 
January 4
th 1926 decision concerning his removal from dynastic succession, and, finally, his 
proclamation as king by dethroning his under-aged son, Michael I (b. 1921) were conducted 
with  the  help  of  many  personalities  and  groups,  hostile  to  PNL,  especially  among  PNȚ. 
However, one can identify a difference in attitude since Mihalache clearly expressed his view 
for a “restoration”, while Maniu was rather elusive, trying to keep the impression of legality, 
but without opposing the coup d’etat in any way (106). Meanwhile, the monarch manifested 
his authoritarian and hedonist nature and the attitudes towards him and his plans would lead 
the divisions, dissident groups within political parties, including in the PNȚ, where the Maniu 
-  Vaida rivalry was  speculated. Although N.  Lupu, C. Stere and Grigore  Iunian were all 
Leftist  Peasants’,  they  did  not  form  a  compact  group,  but,  in  February  1933,  Stere’s 
Democratic  Peasants'  Party,  emerged  from  the  PNȚ  in  1930,  merged  with  The  Radical 
Peasants’ Party, emerged from PNȚ in 1931, forming The Radical Peasants’ Party under the 
leadership of Iunian, with pro-Charles II views, while N. Lupu, vehemently anti-Charles II, 
returned to PNȚ in March 1934 (107). The December 1933 elections revealed, on one hand, 
the “classic” fraud of the government party organizing the elections (PNL) and, on the other, 
the  fragmentation  of  Romanian  agrarianism.  Thus,  P.N.Ţ.  obtained  14%  of  votes  and  29 
mandates, PȚ - Lupu, 5.11 % and 11 mandates, and PRȚ, 2.78 % and 6 mandates; in the 
Assembly of Deputies there were also two agrarian parties, at least in name, but with right 
wing programs, both created in 1932: The National Agrarian Party, led by Octavian Goga, 
with 4.1% and 9 mandates, and the Agrarian Union, led by Constantin Argetoianu with 2.46% 
and 5 mandates (108). 
In  order  to  halt  the  communists’  rise  in  the  years  1931-1932,  the  Bulgarian 
government resorted to acts of authority, such as invalidating 15 of the 29 deputies from 
Bulgarian Workers' Party, or the dissolution of the Sofia Municipal Council, where the party 
won the majority of mandates (109). 
In  Romania,  the  communist  threat  only  meant  the  fact  that  the  “Workers’  and 
Peasants’ Block” achieved the 2% threshold in the 1931 elections, organized by the Iorga- 
Argetoianu government, but the governing National Peasants’ used the Bolshevik threat to 
justify the repression of strikes from Lupeni (August 1929) and Griviţa (15 to 16 February 
1933). 
In  Stamboliiski’s  Bulgaria,  public  manifestations  of  opposition  forces  were  often 
thwarted by The Orange Guard, made up of peasants armed with clubs, but in Romania, Ion 
Mihalache had the initiative of forming self-defense groups of the PNȚ, “the hefty ones”, 
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symbol  of  violence,  which  was  more  and  more  present  in  Romanian  politics.  The  “Iuliu 
Maniu” guards, established around 1934, would gain quite a reputation in the fall of 1944. 
A  key  feature  of  Stamboliiski’s  government,  also  noticeable  in  The  Romanian 
National Peasants’ party, was the lack of specialized and experienced individuals and this was 
solved by appointment in leadership positions of less qualified people, but considered loyal, 
often selected on the basis of family (“nepotism” or “intercessors”) (110). 
Al. Vaida Voivod government's resignation in November 1933, requested by King 
Charles II (1930-1940) and the coup d’etat from Bulgaria on May 19
th 1934, marked the entry 
into opposition of the National Peasants’ Party,  and of the Vrabča 1 group. Since the bloody 
(counter) coup d’etat of January 22
nd 1935, King Boris became dominant in the Bulgarian 
political  life  in  the  second  half  of  the  1930s,  and  both  the  Romanian  Peasants  and  the 
Bulgarian Agrarians would be in opposition to royal authoritarian governments that benefited, 
at least until 1938-1939, from a favorable economic context. 
Within PNȚ, the main fault line was no longer between nationals and Peasants, but 
between the supporters and opponents of the sovereign. As the president of the party between 
November 1933 and November 1937, Ion Mihalache proved to be an element of balance both 
within it and in the relationship with the king, more and more disliked by Maniu and admired 
by Vaida, who left PNȚ in 1935 and created The Romanian Front, a nationalist party (111). 
After the institution of the authoritarian regime and the creation of The National Renaissance 
Front, as a single party, in February and March, and respectively, December 16
th 1938, some 
of  PNȚ’s  leaders,  including  former  Peasants,  joined  this  organization,  the  best  known 
example being Armand Călinescu, head of the government  
In Bulgaria there was not a unique royal party, but in the local elections from between 
March and September 1939 (112).January 1937 and the parliamentary elections of March 
1938  and  December1939  candidates  had  to  go  to  the  polls  in  a  uninominal  system,  not 
representing a specific party, although the reality was different, and Săbranje only had an 
advisory role (113). Thus, in March 1938, among the 160 elected deputies, there were 32 
agrarians, 8 Social Democrats and 5 communist, but the mandates of the communists, as some 
of the agrarians’, were not validated (114). In the following elections, the opposition could not 
muster more than one eighth of the mandates (20 of 160) (115). 
Like  their  Bulgarian  counterparts,  before  the  Molotov-Ribbentrop  Pact,  Romanian 
communists sought to approach the Peasants, under the policy of a “popular front”, imposed 
by the Comintern.  Thus, at  the parliamentary  elections  of 1936 (116), as  in  the general 
elections, at the end of next year, observing the line imposed by Moscow, the Communist 
Party of Romania (illegal) supported PNȚ’s candidates, even if the latter, again led by Maniu, 
signed a non-aggression pact with the party “Everything for the Country”, the political wing 
of the Legionary Movement, an extremist right-wing group (116). 
The dramatic events in the period September 1940-April 1941 when both Romania, 
territorially reduced and threatened the USSR, and Boris III’s Bulgaria, territorially enlarged 
and courted by the same USSR, entered Nazi Germany’s alliance system, have changed the 
political actions of agrarian groups in the two states. 
In 1941, Ion Mihalache had a more positive attitude than Maniu to  general  (from 
August 21
st 1941 a Marshal) Ion Antonescu’s (b.1882-d.1946, “leader of the Romanian state” 
between September 5
th 1940 and August 23
rd 1944) decision to join Hitler's Germany in the 
anti-Soviet war effort (117). He even enlisted in the army as a volunteer, at almost 60 years 
old,  an  initiative,  which,  after  the  establishment  of  the  pro-communist  Petru  Groza 
government  in  March  1945,  would  result  in  the  confiscation  of  his  farm  from  Dobreşti-
Muscel. Moreover, on December 15
th 1936, Mihalache made a memorable statement in the 
Parliament, namely that Romania, in a possible new general war, should join the group that 
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Agrarians  in  both  countries  did  not  agree,  generally,  with  the  pro-German 
governments, in particular with declaring the state of war with Great Britain and the United 
States at the end of 1941, but this opposition was expressed differently, in Romania through 
letters  and  memos  addressed  to  Antonescu,  and  in  Bulgaria,  including  by  organizing 
resistance movements. Thus, in 1941, at the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, in which 
Bulgaria did not take part, Leftist agrarians, Pladne, joined the communists, Social Democrats 
and the organization Zveno (“The Link”), forming “The Fatherland Front”, a more and more 
active and credible movement as the Red Army approached the state borders. They rose to 
power  on  September  9
th  1944,  after  the  leader  of  the  other  agrarian  party,  K.  Muraviev, 
appointed P.M. on September 2
nd 1944, had failed to conclude a truce with the U.S. and UK 
and avoid the entry of Soviet troops in the country (119). 
In Romania, where the communists were very weak, and the leaders of the “historical” 
parties (primarily Maniu) were hesitant, the removal of Antonescu was achieved on August 
23
rd  1944  by  King  Michael  I  and  a  group  of  loyal  officers.  This  act  meant,  at  least 
chronologically, the start of the seizure of political power by the communists, carried slower 
than in Bulgaria, where they were stronger.  
Considering that the modern, Western structures, institutions and attitudes (bourgeois 
liberal) were weak, the agrarian/peasants’ current proved, in both countries, the most powerful 
obstacle to the total communization, as expressing the aspirations and the individualist or 
communitarian mentality of a large part of the population, which were, on a short or long 
term, in conflict with the standardizing and depersonalized plans of the communists. The 
tactics used by the communist parties was that of divide et imp era, political fragmentation of 
the agrarians, followed by the liquidation or subordination of the various wings. 
Among the first Bulgarian Agrarians to be marginalized, from September 9
th 1944, 
were members of the Muraviev-Gičev group. Then, differences emerged within the agrarian 
group that that was part of the “Fatherland Front”. G.M. Dimitrov, back from London, and 
Nikola  Petkov  (brother  of  Petko  Petkov)  opposed  the  trends  and  Communization  and 
Sovietization of the country, but not the plans to abolish the monarchy. After the mysterious 
and untimely death of Boris III in 1943, the position of king returned his minor son, Simeon, 
born on June 16
th 1937; on September 15
th 1946, after a referendum, Bulgaria was proclaimed 
a People's Republic. Subsequently, “Gemeto” again took refuge in the West, which Maniu 
and Mihalache would fail to do, and N. Petkov remained in the country, where he founded 
BZNS-N. Petkov, as the official title of BZNS was reserved for the pro-communist faction, 
led in May 1945 by Al. Obbov. Despite all the prohibitions, Petkov's faction won 1.2 million 
votes at the elections of October 27
th 1946 and 99 mandates in Parliament, compared to the 
354 of the “Fatherland Front” (277 Communists, 69 leftist Agrarians, 9 Social Democrats, 8 
Zveno and one for the Radicals) (120). Arrested in June 1947, right in the Săbranje, N. Petkov 
was sentenced to death and hanged in September. He was even denied the right to a last 
communion (he was one of the few Bulgarian politicians with strong religious beliefs) (120). 
In Romania, the communists tried to approach the Peasants especially through “The 
Plowmen’s Front”, a small party created in January 1933 and led by Petru Groza, a large 
landowner  in  Transylvania,  who  had  been  a  member  of  PNR,  and  after  1920  he  joined 
General Averescu, but this did not stop him from becoming the first head of a Romanian 
communist-controlled government on March 6
th 1945. Only two factions were drawn from 
P.N.Ţ., one led by Anton Alexandrescu, and the other by N. Lupu, but only first joined the 
communists and the core of the party, led by Maniu and Ion Mihalache was, in all likelihood, 
the  true  winner  of  the  November  19
th  1946  elections  grossly  falsified  in  favor  of  the 
communists  and  their  allies  at  the  time  (121).  After  the  dissolution  of  the  PNȚ  and  the 
sentencing  of  its  leaders  to  many  years  in  prison,  in  July-November  1947,  the  forced 
abdication of King Michael I followed, on December 30
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Republic  was  proclaimed  (122),  without  any  ad-hoc  referendum.  In  January  1948,  the 
Alexandrescu  faction  was  swallowed  up  in  “The  Plowmen’s  Front”,  which  disbanded  in 
February 1953. Through a twist of fate,  in the same year Iuliu Maniu died in the Sighet 
prison; Ion Mihalache also died in prison, namely in R￢mnicu-Sărat, in March 1963 (123). 
Unlike  Romania,  in  Bulgaria,  the  faction  BZNS,  which  collaborated  with  the 
communists, was allowed to operate formally, as a satellite of the BCP. Thus, of the 400 
mandates  in  Parliament  (institution  with  a  decorative  role),  a  quarter  (99  or  100)  were 
reserved to the agrarian party, and the rest to BCP, “the leading force of the society”. Between 
1964 and 1971, the Agrarians held the presidency of the Assembly, in theory, that of the state, 
represented by Georgi Traikov. In fact, Bulgaria was the first Eastern European socialist state 
that introduced pensions and social security for cooperative peasants in 1957. 
Gičev D. and K. Muraviev were finally released from prison in 1959 and in 1961 
(124) and Al. Stamboliiski would increasingly be eulogized as a progressive and democratic 
leader, a precursor of egalitarian and collectivist socialism in rural areas.  During  the  national 
and nationalist stage of Romanian communism after 1964 there were some historiographical 
reevaluations  of  historical  figures.  Maniu  and  Mihalache’s  actions,  victims  of  communist 
terror, were valued as socially and nationally progressive, especially until 1918, or 1924. 
However, their activities during 1944-1947 were criticized, which was inevitable, and so were 
their attitudes toward the issue of industrialization, which was at least partially justified in the 
light of the actual economic developments worldwide (125). 
The  techno-scientific  revolution  and  the  energy  crisis  was  a  blow  to  the  Leninist 
model of economic development based on heavy industry, energy consumption, and a hyper-
centralized decision mechanism, but it did not represent a historical validation of agrarianism. 
Technologically and economically advanced countries headed towards the post-industrial age, 
they did not return to the agrarian economy. Several of these (U.S., Canada, UK, Australia, 
and New Zealand etc.) are major exporters of food and agriculture products, but with only a 
few  percents  of  the  workforce  being  involved  in  this  economic  sector,  because  of 
modernization and mechanization. 
After the events of November and December 1989, both in Bulgaria and Romania 
there have been attempts to resuscitate agrarian parties, given the return to political pluralism 
and a persistent cleavage communism-anticommunism. In both countries, in the early 1990s, 
there were both anti-communist agrarians and “left” agrarians with a more nuanced attitude 
toward  the  old  regime.  The  anti-communist  agrarian  groups  have  claimed  affinities  with 
Christian  democracy,  an  ideology  born  in  the  Catholic  Western  European  area,  which 
resembled interwar agrarianism if we consider their purpose of representing a middle way 
between  the  individualist  liberalism  and  the  collectivist  socialism,  cultivating  the  idea  of 
balance between competition and solidarity and functional autonomy of small communities 
(subsidiarity).  In  Romania,  this  affiliation,  achieved  clandestinely  by  Corneliu  Coposu 
(b.1914-d.1995) in 1987, was based on the favorable attitude towards the Orthodox Church, 
both in PȚ and then in PNȚ, but especially on the fact that a significant part of Transylvanian 
Romanians were part of the Romanian Church United with Rome (Greek-Catholic), outlawed 
in 1948. 
The political development of the The National Peasants’ Christian and Democratic 
Party  from  Romania  was  more  spectacular  and  dramatic  than  that  of  Bulgarian  anti-
communist Agrarians, who, in 1989, had re-established BZNS-Nikola Petkov, as part of the 
Union  of  Democratic  Forces  (UDF),  the  name  “BZNS”  being  used  by  the  party  which 
survived during communism. Thus, in the 1990 elections it won only 2.4% of the votes, but 
on June 24
th 1992 PNȚCD became the most important party in The Democratic Convention of 
Romania (alliance created on November 26
th 1991, from which PNL had retired on April 22
nd 
1992), and after the parliamentary  elections  of September 27
th 1992, it was  the strongest Cornel POPESCU, George Daniel UNGUREANU  827 
 
opposition parliamentary party. Following the elections of November 1996, it rose to be the 
leading  government  party  in  a  heterogeneous  coalition,  but  a  rapid  collapse  in  the  polls 
followed and it failed to obtain mandates in the Parliament in the November 2000 elections. 
After this, the party was in a scission process (126). The name “Peasants” was perhaps the 
least fit for the party since it got most of its votes from the Transylvanian towns and was very 
poorly represented in rural areas, south and east of the Carpathians. 
Through its level of popularity (basically a few percents), the secondary role in the 
UDF  and  the  ambiguous,  sinuous,  relationship  that  generated  internal  divisions,  with  the 
coalition and its successor, BZNS-Nikola Petkov and the anti-communist agrarian formations 
are very similar, during the entire period since 1989, with the Romanian liberals during 1992-
1996. Anastasia Moser, "Gemeto" Dimitrov’s daughter, born in 1937 and returned home in 
1992, played an important role in the unification and split of the post-1989 Bulgarian agrarian 
formations, especially for the right-wing ones (127). 
After the identity crisis and electoral failures in the early 1990s, “leftist” Bulgarian 
Agrarians regrouped in 1993, forming BZNS-Al. Stambiliiski, a satellite formation of the 
Bulgarian  Socialist  Party,  a  status  that  ensured  a  minimal  representation  in  Săbranje.  În 
Romania, “leftist” agrarianism was represented by The Democratic Agrarian Party, created on 
January 29
th  1990, with Nicolae Ştefan (128) as  honorary president,  a former communist 
official. It won 1.8% of votes in 1990 and 3% in 1992 (129), but was dismantled in the mid-
1990s, after it declared its opposition towards the N. Văcăroiu government. 
It’s  interesting  to  note,  from  a  terminological  perspective,  that  in  pre-communist 
Romania the term ‘agrarians’ had been used by Right-winged political forces (Argetoianu’s, 
Goga’s parties etc.) (130), whilst the word ‘peasants’ was adopted by political forces situated 
further to the Left political spectrum (The National Peasants’ Party and Leftist groups within 
or independent from this party); after almost 50 years of communist rule (131), the situation 
had changed, PNȚCD became a Right-winged party and PDAR a Leftist party! 
3. Conclusions 
Looking from  a historical  perspective, we can say that during this  period, beyond 
some  general  and  easy  to  notice  similarities  between  Bulgarian  agrarians  and  Romanian 
peasants, there were also some differences that had already been shaped at the turn of the 
century, in terms of doctrine, organization and political action. Thus, the Bulgarian agrarians 
laid a greater emphasis on Leftist values (egalitarianism, collectivism, hostile attitude towards 
the monarchy, skepticism  towards the Church etc.) and displayed a radical  attitude when 
dealing  with  political  opponents.  Thus,  the  Stamboliiski  regime  was  more  of  a  populist 
dictatorship than a rural democracy. On the other hand, the Romanian peasants’ adapted to the 
politics and mentalities of their country, and were respectful towards the monarchy and the 
Church. They gradually renounced some radical ideas and finally accepted, with the exception 
of some marginal groups, to merge with The National Party (1924-1926). The climax of these 
differences in attitude towards the monarchy and the far Leftist forces was reached in the 
periods 1923-1924 and 1945-1947.  
In terms of political/elections and governmental success, the Bulgarian agrarians’ huge 
advantage when compared with Romanian peasants is due, largely, to the different statuses of 
Romania and Bulgaria at the end of the First World War.  
Once again,  the results  of our investigation  reveal  the importance of the political, 
institutional, socio-economic, and imagological context for the concrete forms of agrarian 
political  phenomenon.  Also,  they  can  be  used  as  a  starting  point  for  further  analyses  on 
agrarianism/peasants,  but  mostly  for  studies  focused  on  the  early  stages  of  Bulgarian 
agrarianism  and  Romanian  peasants  during  1878-1918  and  their  concrete  and 828    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Political Sciences, European Studies and IR 
 
historiographical evolutions after 1947 and (why not?) the attempts to revitalize them after 
1989. 
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